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PREFACE 
This report has been prepared under contract to the 
CSIRO Urban Water Program that is ably led by Andrew 
Speers.  During its preparation, I have had the 
opportunity to work closely with the Program’s Project 
Managers.  The innovative work they are leading 
suggests that it is technically feasible to significantly 
improve urban water use.  The technical opportunities 
are many and a significant number appear to be 
affordable.  The policy focus of this report is on 
opportunities to make it feasible for some to be realised 
in a cost-effective manner. 
Preparation of this report has been assisted by many 
people who supplied documents and background 
information.  Their contribution is acknowledged with 
gratitude.  In particular, I would like to thank my fellow 
economist John Bowers for his ability to help me think 
through some of the conceptual challenges that underpin 
this report and Stephen Gray for some useful insights 
from the perspective on an engineer.  I would also like to 
thank Sharon Rochow for her ongoing and loyal support 
in times of need. 
 
Mike Young   
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Australia is entering a new era for water management.  
There is considerable demand for improvement in the 
quality of water resources.  In almost all areas where 
there is significant human population, there is no more 
capacity to increase the contaminant load.  In some areas, 
assimilative capacity has been exceeded.   The challenge 
is to find ways to accommodate more people without 
increasing the volume of pollutants that each person puts 
into stormwater and sewage systems.  Where the total 
load can be decreased, significant social, economic and 
environmental benefits can be anticipated. 
The volume of water used in urban systems also requires 
attention.  A recent report on Water and the Australian 
Economy, observes that “policies are needed to ensure 
that the resource is managed as a totality, including 
groundwater, unregulated rivers and water quality.  
Water trading must operate in a system of regulation 
which ensures that individual trades do not impose 
external effects on third parties” (AATS&E 1999).  In the 
Murray Darling Basin, the volume of water available for 
consumptive purposes has been capped.  The search is 
for more efficient ways to use and re-use those resources 
we have.  Focusing on externalities, this report is about 
opportunities to improve water use and quality in a cost-
effective and politically acceptable manner. 
Externalities 
The concept of an externality comes from economics.  An 
“externality” is economic jargon for something that 
influences the welfare of individuals or a community 
through a non-market process.  There is no market 
feedback from the person who experiences the loss or 
gain to the person who creates it (see Figure 1).  Costs 
and values are not revealed and, hence, not taken fully 
into account in the production process (Bowers 1997).  
The system, however, is not as imperfect as some people 
may consider.  A large array of regulatory, community 
and political processes are used to reveal the cost and 
value of externalities to water users.  
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One well-known example of an urban water-use 
externality is the disposal of partially-treated sewage into 
an estuary or ocean.  Any resultant reductions in bathing 
or surfing opportunities are defined as an externality.  
The welfare of those who produce and release the 
sewage into the outfall remains the same no matter how 
many people surf since there is no market feedback 
processes between these two interdependent activities. 
Production of a 







Figure 1  Economic model of showing the nature of an 
externality.  The sale price includes no 
adjustment for the value of improved 
amenities or the cost of pollution 
Positive and negative externalities 
The theory of externalities 
It is useful to distinguish between actions that improve 
people’s welfare and those that detract from it.  A pure 
positive externality is one that increases at least one 
person’s welfare and does not detract from anyone else’s 
welfare.   Conversely, a pure negative externality is one 
that decreases at least one person’s welfare and makes 
no-one better off.   
In practice, few pure positive externalities and few pure 
negative externalities exist.  In most cases, the best we 
can do is talk about externalities in “net” terms.  The  
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construction of a dam, for example, can both reduce the 
value of a wetland and increase the value of recreational 
opportunities. 
The benchmark for defining what is negative and what 
is positive depends upon definitions of individual 
rights to use the environment and natural resources.  
Often the benchmark chosen is the status quo.  For 
example, if water is returned in a cleaner state than it is 
removed then this action is defined as a pure positive 
externality.  If the returned water is more contaminated 
than it was when extracted from the natural system, then 
this action could be defined as production of a pure 
negative externality.  This is the way most economists 
define externalities. 
The practice 
Generally, use rights and obligations are defined in 
legislation, regulations and catchment management 
plans.   Real property arrangements and license 
conditions also affect such definitions, as does common 
law.   Collectively, all these mechanisms define each 
person’s duty of care for the environment.   Duty of care 
for the environment is a term gaining gradual 
acceptance in rural areas. 1  
Duty of care is a new concept for urban water users.2  
Often the implied definition of duty of care suggests 
some degree of social acceptance and tolerance of 
practices that degrade the environment.  Water users are 
allowed to create some ‘negative’ externalities but not 
too many! 
As there is no market for the production of externalities, 
complex community consultation and planning 
processes are used to define duty of care. Acceptance of a 
duty of care benchmark means that any activity that 
produces an outcome above this standard is a positive 
externality.  Duty of care, however, is not a static 
                                                 
1   Under some measures of welfare, the money so collected 
should be used to compensate the people impacted by the negative 
externality so that no person is made worse off as a result of its 
imposition. 
2   The idea of duty of care for the environment was developed 
by Binning and Young (1998) and has since been given wider 
currency by the Industry Commission (1998).    
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concept.  In particular, management plans often propose 
to change the way duty of care is defined.  Most 
catchment management plans suggest an expectation 
that standards will be raised through time and raised 
without payment of compensation.  For example, the 
discharge of secondary treated sewage to many river 
systems was considered acceptable until algal blooms 
became common.  Now, in many areas, tertiary 
treatment is required.   
Duty of care is an evolving concept (Figure 2). 
Catchment Management plans can define duty of care 
as a set of minimum water quality objectives that all 
users must pursue.  This means that positive 
externalities may initially be most appropriately dealt 
with through the use of positive price signals but, at 
some stage in the future, be more appropriately 
managed via the use of negative price signals.  Further 
explanation is necessary to clarify this point.  To speed 
adjustment, initially, people causing the externality 
might be paid an incentive to encourage them to change 
practice.  After an appropriate period, however, all might 
be expected to adopt the preferred practice.  When 
compliance becomes a duty, those who do not comply 
should be penalised via the imposition of levies, fines, 
etc.  
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Figure 2   Dynamic nature of the distinction between 
positive and negative externalities.  Actions 
defined as positive today may be defined as 




Figure 3 summarises these concepts by presenting an 
externalities meter.  The gap between costs currently 
imposed on water users and duty of care indicates the 
extent of negative externalities.  The gap between duty of 
care and the policy target represents the extent of 
positive externalities.  
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 Duty of Care
Use negative price signals so
that profits increase as the
duty of care limit is
approached
Costs included in 
current charges
←  Policy Target
 
Figure 3   A “meter” showing the proportion of costs 
included in current charges, the increase 
necessary to fully cost negative externalities as 
defined by definitions of duty of care and 
reimbursement arrangements necessary to 
deliver a policy target defined through 
community consultation processes3  
Urban water externalities 
Surprisingly, there has been no review of the nature and 
extent of externalities associated with urban water use in 
Australia.  Much of the relevant information, however, 
can be found in state of environment reports, in 
catchment management plans and in guidelines for the 
management of stormwater and sewage.4   
                                                 
3   This diagram is adapted from concepts developed by 
Dames and Moore-NRM when contracted to develop cost sharing 
rules for natural resource management. 
4   Given this it would be timely for someone to commission a 
report on the extent and nature of externalities associated with 
water use in Australia.    
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The CSIRO Urban Water Program integrates water-
supply, water-use, wastewater-return and stormwater 
considerations.  From an engineering and system design 
perspective, this integrated approach simplifies water 
modelling.  From an externalities perspective, however, 
a more efficient and effective set of outcomes is likely 
to emerge if separate instruments are used to deliver 
each water supply, waste water and stormwater 
objective.5 Separation means that trade-offs among 
issues can be achieved efficiently through time.  If 
knowledge about one issue changes then the instrument 
associated with it can be adjusted without consequence 
for other issues.  As far as possible, this report separates 
the consideration of  
•  Water- supply, water-use and waste-water return 
disposal externalities  
•  from storm-water externalities. 
Water-supply, use and return externalities 
Conceptually, urban water-supply, water-use, and 
wastewater-return externalities occur at three locations:   
•  In association with dams and the streams, rivers and 
ecosystems they interfere with; 
•  In association with the built environment where 
water is consumed; and 
•  In association with the return of contaminated 
wastewater to the environment. 
Water-supply externalities 
Examples of upstream or supply externalities include 
both direct impacts at the storage site and, also, effects 
that storage has on the performance of river and 
groundwater systems.  These externalities are generated, 
in part, by competing demands for water.  The more 
water diverted into the urban supply system, the less 
available to support agriculture and to maintain valuable 
environmental functions.  All water has an opportunity 
                                                 
5   The Tinbergen Principle applies.  For an institutional 
solution to remain dynamically efficient, each objective should be 
managed via a separate policy instrument so that one can be varied 
without having to change the other.    
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cost6 and, in the absence of a competitive market for it, 
sometimes allocation to the urban sector may not be its 
highest and best use. 
In–situ water-use externalities  
In-situ water-use externalities tend to be associated with 
amenity values.  A visually attractive garden, for 
example, could be defined as a positive externality, but 
there is a social expectation that there is no need to 
compensate people for the marginal cost of producing 
such benefits.  The marginal cost of watering a large 
recreational area, however, may represent a community 
service that should be reimbursed.   An example of a 
negative externality within an urban area, for which a 
negative price signals should be sent, may be the fear of 
the health impacts of “grey” water application to a 
garden.  These are in-situ water-use externalities. 
Waste-water return externalities  
The range of return externalities associated with urban 
water use depends, almost entirely, on the extent of 
wastewater treatment and the way that water is disposed 
of.  For example, the cost of return externalities 
associated from a well-located ocean outfall may be 
small even though the waste is only partially treated, but 
the cost of ex-situ externalities associated with 
wastewater returned to a river system may be high due 
to the limited volume of receiving water.  In short, the 
magnitude of the impact of an externality can be 
expected to vary from location to location. 
Stormwater externalities 
Stormwater externalities, unlike water supply 
externalities, only have in-situ and downstream effects.  
Moreover, many of the externalities associated with 
stormwater management are caused by factors other 
than water use.  A large proportion of stormwater 
contaminants, for example, results from processes not 
associated with water use.  In cities, many of the by-
products of motor vehicle use find their way into 
stormwater.  Where this creates a problem, it may be 
more efficient to change the price signals given to vehicle 
                                                 
6             Opportunity cost is the value of the resources that are used 
in providing the water.   
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users than to try and send a signal indirectly by changing 
stormwater management procedures. 
In-situ stormwater externalities 
“In-situ” stormwater externalities express themselves 
through the effects on flows on stream, river, wetland 
and groundwater values and contaminant loads to the 
environment.7 As summarised in a recent Western 
Australia report (Evangelisi Associates et al.  1998), there 
are many opportunities to convert negative stormwater 
externalities into positive ones.  Open space recreation 
areas, for example, provide an attractive alternative to a 
concrete drain.   Similarly, Melbourne Water has recently 
begun a process of using stormwater to create a series of 
urban wetlands.8 
Ex-situ stormwater externalities  
“Downstream” stormwater externalities express 
themselves via their effects on base and peak stream 
flows and the volume and nature of contaminants in 
receiving waters.  Impacts on flow regimes are 
particularly important.  Zinc contamination from the use 
of galvanised roofing, fences and poles, for example, is 
emerging as a serious stormwater contaminant.   
Alternative classifications 
Accumulative contaminants 
Externalities can also be classified into those not 
involving contaminants, those involving contaminants 
that can be assimilated into their receiving ecosystems 
and those that accumulate through time.  Litter poses 
amenity problems and can damage wildlife.  
Contaminants like nitrogen, phosphate and salt can be 
assimilated into most environments and, indeed, exist 
                                                 
7   Surface and groundwater systems are often interlinked.  In 
some parts of Adelaide, for example, urban water and land-use 
practice can result in rising water table that can, in return, cause 
dryland salinity problems.   In some urban areas, base stream flows 
are made up almost entirely of groundwater flow from shallow 
unconfined aquifers.  Pollution of these aquifers from, excessive use 
of garden fertilisers, can result in significant contamination of urban 
water bodies such as Adelaide’s River Torrens (Barnett et al.  1996).   
8   As establishment is being funded from the Natural Heritage 
Trust, this should probably be defined as a positive externality.    
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naturally in most environments.  Normally, however, 
their effects dissipate.  Accumulative contaminants, like 
most heavy metals, however, have long term 
consequences that are neither easily valued nor easily 
reversed. 
Sequential and nodal systems 
Finally, the nature of the effect of urban water 
externalities and the methods necessary to manage them 
will vary according to the nature of downstream uses.  
Costs are likely to be quite different in systems where 
water is used sequentially from systems where use is 
nodal.  The Murray Darling System provides an excellent 
example of a sequential water system.  In sequential 
systems, water from one town is returned so that others 
can use it.   Sequential systems have more receptors and 
more factors to be considered.  As a result, the standards 
set for such systems are often higher.   Issues like the 
additional costs of making water fit for human 
consumption and the costs that salt impose on urban 
infrastructure need to be considered.  In “nodal” 
systems, like those used to supply Sydney and 
Melbourne, water is typically taken from a dam high up 
in a catchment and only used for human consumption 
purposes once.  Water is used once then typically 
released to the ocean after treatment. 
Effects of externalities 
As indicated above, economists define externalities as an 
action that affects the welfare of people via a non-market 
process.  From an urban water perspective, the range of 
welfare effects associated with an externality include 
affects on  
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•  health (sickness and death); 
•  recreation opportunities; 
•  property values and opportunities to earn income; 
•  the cost of protecting property from adversity 
(defensive expenditure); 
•  amenity values; and 
•  environmental values associated, for example, with 
wildlife protection and the prevention of heavy metal 
contamination. 
A methodology showing how these costs can be 
estimated has been provided in a separate report to the 
program (Bowers and Young, 1999).  The presence of 
these externalities, however, means that governments 
and the community must monitor and manage them.  
Thus, for completeness, the costs of resource and 
environmental management should be included in any 
assessment of the cost of externalities. 
Opportunities to improve the distribution of externalities 
Having defined the nature of externalities, we can now 
explore ways to reduce the negative and increase the 
positive nature of them.   The goal is to find a mix of 
policy instruments that will deliver the environmental 
outcomes set out in management plans at least cost.  
Conceptually, and at the most general level, the main 
opportunities lie with mechanisms that change values, 
reduce the total demand for water, or reduce the 
quantity of contaminants released into water bodies.  It 
may be possible to improve the nature of return flows.   
The remainder of this paper focuses on opportunities to 
increase the incentive for people to bring about such 




- Financial;  and 
- Regulatory. 
In practice, a mix of mechanisms will be used to achieve 
the optimal outcome in any location.  Not all will be 
appropriate for all circumstances.  Moreover, as  
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behavioural and biophysical conditions change, the mix 
will need to be changed so as to continue to deliver an 
optimal outcome (Young et al.  1995; Gunningham and 
Young 1997).   
Information 
Virtually all environmental programs and incentive 
systems need to be underpinned by the use of a suite of 
information programs.  Information mechanisms aim to 
improve understanding of biophysical and economic 
processes.  ACTEW, for example, claims that one of the 
reasons for the success of its policy reforms is that they 
have invested heavily in communication and information 
programs.  Changes in water charges were accepted 
because people understood that this would be cheaper 
than building a new dam.   
In a parallel study to this report, Syme (1999) reports that 
community knowledge about the urban water processes 
is very limited.  Where knowledge about the system is 
poor, perverse and unpredictable responses to incentive 
packages are likely.  Consequently, there may be 
considerable opportunities and dividends associated 
with improvement of the extent and availability of 
information about urban water sources and the impact 
of its use. 
One information mechanism, not yet used in the water 
industry, is a water efficiency rating system for houses.  
The closest example of such a system is the five star 
energy rating system now in use for housing in the 
ACT.9  Introduced in 1998, this system classifies each 
house according to the degree to which it is designed to 
conserve energy.  No house may be sold without first 
obtaining an energy rating and providing it to a 
prospective buyer.  Essentially, the less glass, the more 
double glazing, the more insulation etc the higher the 
rating is.   Conceptually, a water rating system could be 
developed for urban water use.  The highest rating 
would be reserved for houses characterised by 
appliances, wastewater return, stormwater management 
and garden systems that minimise negative 
environmental impact.  As with the ACT Energy rating 
                                                 
9   Energy Efficiency Ratings (Sale of Premises) Act 1997.  
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system, regulations could require that no house may be 
sold without first obtaining a water rating and 
providing it to a purchaser before a contract is signed. 
Motivational mechanisms 
Motivational mechanisms aim to change social behaviour 
by rewarding people who demonstrate best practice and 
are prepared to lead changes in attitude by example.  
Typically, they seek to influence community norms and 
perceptions of each person’s responsibility to reduce the 
extent of urban water pollution.  Often there is little 
difference between informational and motivational 
mechanisms.  Surprisingly, motivational mechanisms 
have not been used widely as a means to improve 
stormwater and waste-water management.  This is 
probably because water quality management is seen 
more as an issue that is the responsibility of government 
rather than community.  Nevertheless, it is likely that 
programs like the “Tidy Town” competitions and “Keep 
Australia Beautiful” Campaigns have had a considerable 
but, as yet, unmeasured impact of the extent of negative 
externalities associated with urban water use.   
Right-market mechanisms 
Right-market mechanisms10 are a subset of property-
right mechanisms that change or introduce a restraint on 
market process.  Many variants of right-market 
mechanisms exist.  The list includes  
•  tradeable development rights; 
•  off-set mechanisms; 
•  tradeable emission quota; 
•  tradeable water rights; and  
•  some load-based regulatory systems like bubble 
licences.   
                                                 
10   Right-market mechanisms are often called property right 
mechanisms and economic instruments.  These terms, however, are 
ambiguous.  The characteristic that differentiates these instruments 
from all other instruments is the fact that they involve the transfer of 
rights to use the environment or a natural resource through a 
market process.  
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From an urban-water perspective, the main advantage of 
right-market mechanisms is the incentive they give water 
users and developers to search for ways to reduce 
externalities across the entire locality.  In particular, they 
can be used to create incentives for people to reduce 
externalities associated with use in old established areas.  
Subjective opinion would suggest that it is often these 
systems, not greenfield sites, that produce the most 
externalities.   
Off-set mechanisms 
Off-set mechanisms allow increases in an activity 
provided any increase in the extent of negative 
externalities produced is off-set by a reduction 
elsewhere.  They are best suited to situations where 
environmental or development capacity has been 
reached.  Most operate by making development 
approval conditional upon the reduction of loads or 
flows elsewhere.  Their advantage over tradeable 
emission rights is that they can be tacked onto existing 
regulatory processes for little additional cost.  In 
particular, once the implementation of the off-set has 
been verified often there is no need to set up a 
monitoring system and no need to allocate rights to 
existing users.   
An emissions off-set system, for example, would be well-
suited to situations where there is benefit in reducing 
stormwater run-off (Young 1994).  Under such a scheme, 
any person who wishes, to extend their house would 
need to arrange for the removal of some sealed area 
nearby so that the aggregate amount of run-off would 
stay the same. 
An operational example of such an off-set system can be 
found in Hessen, Germany where a quite complex suite 
of off-set arrangements are used to reduce the costs that 
urban development imposes on five environmental 
problems.  Stormwater run-off is one of these.  Aspiring 
developers are given the choice between paying for the 
marginal cost of expanding the storm-water system 
(presumably including the cost of all externalities) or 
arranging to off-set the impact of their proposed 
development on the storm-water flows.  Given the 
choice, most developers prefer to find ways to off-set 
increases in the impervious area and or run- 
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off (Young 1992).  Impervious parking areas are being 
replaced with pervious ones, roof run-off is being 
diverted to garden ponds, and roads are being narrowed.  
The result has been an increase in urban density without 
an increase in stormwater run-off.11 
In United States of America, off-set mechanisms are 
being used to reduce nitrate and phosphate pollution.  
This is achieved by estimating the expected increase in 
contaminant flows from development proposals, such 
as a proposed sewage treatment works, and then 
requiring this increase to be off-set.  Often the result 
has been a number of what are called ‘non-point source 
to point source’ trades.  Typically, a sewage treatment 
plant is allowed to off-set a proposed increase in 
emissions by producing a two or three fold reduction in 
contaminant flows from non-point sources like a dairy.  
The result is a significant improvement in water quality 
at no cost to taxpayers (Young and Evans 1997).    
The main advantage of off-set mechanisms is that they 
provide a strong incentive for people to search for cost-
effective means to retrofit existing installations.  They 
avoid allowing the situation to deteriorate and encourage 
the resolution of old problems so that new opportunities 
can be pursued. Furthermore it is the developer, 
motivated by the desire to control costs, who seeks the 
solution, rather than the regulator. This means that off-
set mechanisms are economically efficient.  
Most off-set mechanisms include a “no backsliding 
provision.”  No backsliding means that the standard 
building regulations still apply.  The mechanism cannot 
be used to get around an existing regulation. 
In Australia, off-set arrangements could be applied at 
either the individual development proposal level or at 
the local government level.  Linked to the development 
approval process, off-set mechanisms could be used to 
create a strong incentive for people to reduce negative 
externalities.  All urban expansion, for example, could be 
made conditional upon off-set arrangements that would 
apply across any part of the entire catchment.  The 
catchment could be defined to include either the 
                                                 
11   A system similar to this has been proposed for 
Melbourne (Young 1994).  
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immediate agricultural hinterland or, possibly, a much 
larger area.  The main attraction of a mechanism like this 
is that it would provide all developers and councils with 
an incentive to reduce stormwater run-off from existing 
areas.   
Similarly, off-set arrangements for nitrate and phosphate 
could be introduced for a region, like Ellenbrook (the test 
case site used for the UWP), where nutrients from all 
sources are thought to account for around 30% of the 
nutrient load for the Swan River.  Any development 
anticipated, that is expected to increase the total nutrient 
load to the Swan River, would be required to off-set that 
increase.  Two options would be possible, a ‘one for one’ 
point source exchange or a ‘two for one’ non-point 
source for point-source exchange. 
Load-based licensing 
Typically, firms and waste water treatment plants obtain 
a licence to dispose of contaminants into water bodies, 
the air or in land fills.  These pollution licences usually 
specify the type of equipment that may be used.  
Maximum concentrations are often specified.  Load-
based licensing takes this process one step further and 
places limits on the total quantity of pollutants 
allowed.  The sum of the limits in all licences can then be 
managed and debated as a policy target.   Load-based 
licences provide the information stream, and establish 
the database, for many of the other instruments 
described in this report.  Load-based licensing is a 
precursor to the introduction of tradeable emission 
right systems and emission charges. 
Not surprisingly, the introduction of load-based 
licensing is being routinely recommended as an 
appropriate way to reduce externalities associated with 
urban water use.  Recent examples of such 
recommendations include COAG (1999), Brunton (no 
date), and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999).  Load-based 
licences seek to make polluters aware of the total load 
they are placing on the environment and, also, to cap 
emissions within acceptable limits.  Interesting examples 
of load-based licence arrangements are now emerging 
across Australia.  In Victoria, a pollution loading index 
has been introduced and a two-part charging system, 
with one part set in proportion to the load index.  
Innovatively, the charge is reduced for licensees  
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accredited as using best environmental practices 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1999). 
A major issue for all load-based licensing systems is the 
question of who should hold the licence.  In areas like 
Ellenbrook, a household licensing system would 
probably be too expensive to administer but with the 
emergence of smart monitoring technologies, nodal 
licensing systems could be introduced at the estate level.  
Each estate would be licensed to add not more than a 
specified load of pollutants to the system.  Collectively, 
the load from each estate or node in the collection system 
would add up to the total load permitted for the 
Ellenbrook region.  The result would be an incentive for 
each estate to seek ways to reduce total contaminant 
loads to the waste-water and storm-water system. 
Load-based licensing also facilitates to the introduction 
of bubble licences.  Typically, a bubble licence stipulates 
that the total load of contaminants is fixed but, within the 
area they control, the holder of a licence is free to change 
the source of this load as much as they want.  
Introduction of load-based licences, especially their 
specification as regional bubble licences, would create 
strong incentives for people to search for new ways to 
reduce the contaminant load.  In the Ellenbrook region, 
each council area could be allocated a load-based licence 
and then left to find ways to keep emissions within their 
total allocation.  Trading among councils could be 
permitted.   
Introduction of load-based licences is also the first step 
toward the introduction of tradeable emission-right 
systems.  These systems are quite complex to establish 
and have only been used in Australia to control salt 
loads.12  
Tradeable water rights 
As a result of the COAG water reform agenda, irrigators 
throughout Australia are beginning to trade water rights.  
These licences entitle their holder to extract a specified 
volume of water each year.   Both annual allocations and 
                                                 
12   For a discussion of their merits and there application to 
other problems see James (1997), Young and Evans (1997), 
Young (1994) and NSW (1998).  
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the right to receive such allocations are now being 
bought and sold.  As a result, water is becoming a 
valuable commodity.  Rapid structural adjustment is 
beginning to occur.  One of the consequences of the 
introduction of tradeable water rights is that water 
users are now searching for alternative, cheaper sources 
of water.  As a direct result new markets for grey water 
and, even, for stormwater, are beginning to emerge.  
One outcome has been the emergence of a new set of 
disputes over property.  In the past, virtually all urban 
water, after appropriate treatment, was returned to river, 
estuary and oceans as a free good available to other users 
and the environment.  Now that water can be sold, some 
sewage treatment plants are seeking opportunities to sell 
treated effluent rather than return it to the system it came 
from.  Throughout much of the Murray Darling Basin, 
for example, the sale of effluent water to irrigators is an 
expanding activity.   Similarly, SA Water is selling 
increasing amounts of treated effluent to market 
gardeners on the North Adelaide Plains.  From an 
externality perspective, the introduction of tradeable 
water rights of this form means a reduction in 
contaminant flows at no cost to existing users.  
Another interesting example of the impact of new water 
trading arrangements and increased prices, is the 
creation of artificial wetlands that “clean” stormwater 
and then use this water to recharge wetlands.  In 
Adelaide, the institution that is doing this has been 
granted a licence to extract part of the returned water for 
irrigation in the following summer.   
Pricing opportunities 
Pricing policy has a number of functions.  First, pricing 
policies can be used to signal the importance of taking 
account of externalities.  Second, they can be used to 
internalise the cost of externalities in an attempt to make 
water use optimal.  Third, via voluntary arrangements, 
they can be used to re-imburse people for the cost of 
providing positive externalities.  Throughout much of 
Australia, urban water pricing arrangements are also 
used as a means to tax land-users and to redistribute 
income.    
CSIRO  22  Policy and Economic 
Land and Water     Research Unit 
Signaling negative externalities 
As a recent COAG paper on incorporating externalities 
into water pricing13 observes “even a nominal 
environmental charge in water pricing regimes would 
convey a strong message to water users.”  Pursuing this 
reasoning, several States and Territories have introduced 
levies and charges for discharges into the environment.  
Most of these environmental levies seek to signal 
environmental responsibility and, as far as we are aware, 
are not intended to fully internalise the cost of 
externalities.  Examples of recent signalling initiatives 
include 
•  South Australia’s load-based fee structure for point-
source discharges into all waters; and 
•  Victoria’s combined flat fee and load-based fee 
system for licensed discharges into waters 
(Brunton undated). 
The South Australian system is based on a sophisticated 
formula where the fee payable is calculated by formula 
that multiplies flow rate by salinity factor by pollutant 
class by an area impact factor.14 
NSW is in the process of introducing a complex load-
based licensing system.  As yet, however, no state has 
introduced a load-based fee system for sewage effluent 
disposal or stormwater disposal at either the estate or the 
household level. 
Full-cost pricing 
In 1994, COAG developed a water reform agenda 
recommending that all states and territories begin a 
transition to full cost recovery for water use.  Cross 
subsidies are to be removed and water rights are to be 
separated from land title.  Full cost recovery is defined 
to include environmental costs and is generally 
assumed to equate with what economists define as 
lone-run marginal cost.  At the end of the transition 
                                                 
13   COAG 17th Meeting, 2 July 1999 Agenda Item 3c (ii).  The 
paper recommends endorsement of nominal charges.  The paper 
sees a need for two types of charge.  A Resource Management 
Charge and an Environmental Charge. 
14   Environment Protection (Fees and Levy) Regulations 1994 - 
Schedule 3  
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process, the proposal is that water pricing regimes in all 
States and Territories should reflect the situation set out 
in Figure 4.  All States and Territories are now in the 
process of moving toward such an arrangement.  In 
many areas, however, water charges are still less that the 
full cost of supply.  To improve externalities, either 
prices must be raised, subsidies for alternative processes 
must be introduced, or changes must be forced through 
regulatory and development control processes. 
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Figure 4  An overview of the final water pricing regime 
endorsed by COAG15  
As a general rule, the introduction of full cost pricing 
mechanisms is likely to significantly modify urban water 
use.  There are two options that can be followed as full 
cost pricing is introduced.  It is possible to introduce 
                                                 
15   Water trading will reduce the opportunity cost of 
water use to zero.  Although not yet incorporated into 
COAG literature, economic discipline would suggest a 
need to include the cost of government support for 
research and development on water resource issues in 
any attempt to measure the full costs of water use.  The 
benchmark for determination of whether or not an 
externality is positive or negative is that defined as the 
duty of care in each catchment plan.  
CSIRO  24  Policy and Economic 
Land and Water     Research Unit 
•  general environmental levies and resource 
management charges; or 
•  sophisticated charging systems that provide problem 
specific incentives to reduce negative externalities. 
Whichever approach is taken, the result is likely to be a 
significant improvement.  In the Hunter Valley, for 
example, the simple introduction of a two part tariff that 
recovered supply costs reduced average annual water 
use from 300KL per household to 220KL per household 
(James 1997).   In combination with emission charges and 
tradeable emission licences, a similar improvement in the 
extent of negative externalities could be expected.  
Negative and positive externalities need to be considered 
separately.  As indicated in Figure 4 and Figure 2, 
positive price signals are needed to generate an optimal 
supply of positive externalities. 
Charging for negative externalities 
As a general rule, the more closely these fees align with 
the source of the externality, the greater the effect on 
negative externalities will be.  Obvious opportunities to 
reduce negative externalities include introduction of 
nodal charging systems.  Nodal charging systems use 
smart metering and monitoring techniques to levy 
users in proportion to the load at each point in a 
sewage system.  Each group of water users then has a 
financial incentive to search for ways to reduce sewage 
treatment costs and the total load of contaminants 
returned to the environment.  It is significant that, in 
cases where nodal and point source charging systems 
have been introduced, trade-waste disposal industries 
have emerged as companies begin to search for ways to 
dispose of waste that are cheaper than dropping it into 
the sewage system (James 1997, Brunton undated). 
When recommending full-cost pricing mechanisms, 
emission charges etc, it is important to assign them so 
that their incidence encourages improvement.  In the 
case of stormwater pollution, for example, the first best 
solution may be to charge motor vehicles and people 
who use galvanised metal rather than simply levying 
all users.  In other cases, it may be more efficient to place 
a levy on detergents.  The revenue collected from 
environment levies of this kind could then be returned to 
those whose actions reduce stormwater contamination in  
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a manner that creates a new business opportunity for 
urban water managers. 
Finally, where direct metering of the causes of negative 
externalities is not cost effective, levies can be placed on 
surrogate or proxy indicators.   Potential indicators 
include  
-  The volume of water consumed; 
-  The number of toilets on a property; 
-  The number of people living in an area; and 
-  The sealed or impervious area associated with a 
property. 
While attractive, the main weakness of this surrogate 
approach is the lesser incentive provided for people to 
search for innovative solutions.  A toilet levy, for 
example, provides no incentive for people to explore 
opportunities to divert grey water to their garden.  A 
levy on effluent flow does. 
Reimbursing positive externalities 
Some positive externalities will be created by water users 
because the marginal cost of their provision is zero.  One 
obvious example is the extent of landscape amenity 
benefits that some people derive from a dam.  Other 
examples include the provision of recreational benefits 
through the stormwater-sensitive design options 
mentioned earlier.  As a general rule, such arrangements 
are seen as community service obligations.   In the past, 
the cost of delivering such services has been seen as a 
community obligation.  Privatisation of water supply 
and waste-water management processes, however, 
means that increasingly the marginal costs of community 
service provision will need to be reimbursed so that 
water managers have an incentive to provide them to the 
best of their ability. 
Where the focus is on a change in attitude, voluntary 
mechanisms can be established.  Under the Natural 
Heritage trust for example, communities are encouraged 
to apply for grants to improve the environment.  
Application is voluntary and acceptance of the grant is 
voluntary.  Once all parties are committed, a contractual 
arrangement takes over.  
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Regulatory mechanisms 
Regulatory mechanisms set minimum standards and, 
for new developments, put review processes in place.  
Their main weakness is the lack of incentive they provide 
for people to deliver more than the minimum specified.  
In addition, standards can be difficult to change.  Once 
established they can be locked in.  The power of 
regulations, however, should not be under-estimated.  In 
particular, regulatory processes give administrators the 
power to negotiate for higher standards.  Well 
administered, regulatory processes can be as efficient – if 
not more efficient – than many of the mechanisms 
described above.   
As a general rule, regulations and standards associated 
with them reduce, but do not eliminate, externalities 
associated with water use (McRae et al.1993).  Moreover, 
they provide little incentive for people to develop 
innovative solutions to emerging problems.  As a basic 
platform from which to begin to deal with externalities, 
they are essential in helping to define duty of care for the 
environment, to establish minimum standards and to 
prevent backsliding. 
The aim of this report was to provide a framework from 
which people could begin to understand the nature of 
externalities associated with urban water use.  The first 
point that emerges is the need to separate 
•  urban water supply externalities; 
•  from water-use externalities; 
•  from wastewater return externalities; and 
•  from stormwater externalities. 
Another critical observation is the point that water flows, 
per say, create few externalities.  As a general rule, it is 
water contamination not water flow that is the problem.  
Actions that simply aim to reduce water flows may 
increase negative externalities by reducing the flows that 
maintain quality in many river and wetland systems.   
The report also identifies a range of policy opportunities 
that may improve the nature of externalities.  They 
include 
-  development of a water-use efficiency rating system 
-  introduction of a storm-water off-set mechanism  
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-  nodal load-based licensing for the waste water 
treatment system, with fees charged in proportion to 
the load at each node and a cap on the total load that 
is tradeable among participants; and 
-  Full cost pricing for water use with rebates for the 
marginal cost of community service provision.   
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